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Practical Theology as Social Tthical Action 
in Christian Ministry
Implicati(}ns from Em manuel Levinas and Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
Andrew R oot
Introduction
Practical theology, unlike the other theological disciplines, specifically 
directs itself toward the contem porary m om ent. It puts the church’s his- 
torical theological confessions in conversation w ith  the present conflicts 
and contem plations o f the contem porary church and the larger society  
in w hich it is found, opening lines o f m utual conversation and critique. 
Practical theology has argued that theology is in continual and constant 
developm ent, m oving and advancing w ithin  this convergence o f past re- 
flection and present confrontation. As the church continues m inistering in 
the w orld , so too m ust its theology continue to develop and transition. I 
assert in this article that the context for com tructing Christian theology  
can only be the church’s ministry in the w orld. I w ill contend that the 
ministry o f the church in the w orld  is w hat provides both the context 
and the material for intentionally constructing theology.
If Christian ministry is the context and material for Christian theol- 
ogy, however, w e m ust ask, w h a t  is ministry? I am suggesting that, at its 
heart, ministry is ethical action for the other w ho is both near and far 
neighbor. To m ake this point, I w ill look  to Em m anuel Levinas. I argue 
that if theology is done as practical theology, deliberately uniting theory  
and practice, it avoids the problem s that Levinas sees w ith  the discipline 
and m akes it possible to use his philosophy in constructing a practical 
theology for the other.1
1 Levinas himself supports this task of melding theory and practice, asserting that on 
the road of ethical action one confronts the transcendent metaphysical other. “The 
traditional opposition between theory and practice will disappear before the metaphysical 
transcendence by wbicb a relation witb the absolutely otber, or trutb, is establisbed, and 
of wbicb etbics is the royal road . . . .  We sball go furtber, and, at the risk of appearing to 
confuse tbeory and practice, deal witb both as modes of metaphysical transcendence.” 
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, ?ittsburgh (Duquesne University Press) 1 6 1 و , 
29. This wifi be further developed in the remainder of this article.
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I w ill begin by laying out som e o f the major pillars o f Levinas’s thought 
before turning direetly to his eritique o f theology. M aking Levinas appli- 
eable w ill require a Christologieal reading. I w ill turn to Ray Anderson  
and his diseussion o f the unity o f theology and ministry, show ing the 
im portanee o f a trinitarian understanding o f theology. N ex t, to dem on- 
strate both the possibility and potential in this kind o f reading, I w ill 
plaee Levinas in dialogue w ith  Dietrieh Bonhoeffer, first show ing h ow  
B onhoeffer’s theology is itself a praetieal theology, then looking directly 
at sim ilarities between Levinas’s and B onhoeffer’s m ethods. Finally, I w ill 
conclude by asserting that social ethical responsibility set forth by both  
Levinas and Bonhoeffer is a paradigm  and location  for doing practical 
theology.
The Fillars o f Levinas’s M ethod
Levinas’s philosophy seeks to correct that w hich he believes is the error 
of W estern philosophy, m ost dram atically encom passed in the thought 
of his former philosophical mentor, M artin Heidegger. This error is the 
tendency for the know er to think it is possible to them atize the other in 
such a w ay as to m ake him or her totalized in his or her being. H ence, I 
am able from  the position  o f m y “I” to conceptualize, in totality, w hat it 
m eans for the other to be the other. I think I can grasp him or her felly, 
for I and the other share in the existential state o f our being (which for 
H eidegger is angst). This totalization can lead only to violence, according  
to Levinas, never m oving the I to the other in an openness that w ould  
allow  for ethical action for the other.
Totalization opposes the m etaphysical im pulse w hich recognizes that 
it is im possible for me to k now  the other truly (as one m ight k now  an 
object, even in our shared experience), for there is a chasm  too deep 
and w ide for me to cross. An infinity separates us. The uniqueness o f  
the other stands over against all thoughts and categories I have for her. 
It is only in a connection  to the other in w hich I recognize her infinity, 
w hich is the im possibility for me to grasp and categorize the other, that 
the experience o f the transcendent m etaphysical is possible.^ “Infinity is 
characteristic o f a transcendent being as transcendent؛ the infinite is the 
absolutely other.”3 The I/o th er construct, then, becom es the location  for 
both philosophical contem plation and religious experience.4
2 “Whatever be the extension of my tbougbts, limited by nothing, the Otber cannot be 
contained by me: he is unthinkable-he is infinite and recognized as such.” Ibid., 230. 
Levinas shows here the infinity of the other and the impossibility of my comprehending 
this other. Tbis reality reveals the otber’s transcendence, and in experiencing this other, 
1 myself am tbrown into tbe transcendent.
3 Ibid., 49.
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For this I/o th er construct to exist and not collapse into totalization, 
I and the other m ust m utually and distinctly live as subjects, as egoists. 
For Fevinas, the m ost fundam ental expression o f on e’s unique subjective 
distinction, w hich escapes outside cognition , is enjoyment. It is in enjoy- 
m ent that I am freely m e, freely I, m ost com pletely in touch w ith  myselfA  
In my egoist act o f eating and drinking, I am m ost aware that I am a 
subject, that I am an I that refuses to be totalized. At hom e in m y ow n  
space, in the space I call m ine, I recognize the infinity that separates me 
from  all others . ٤ It is in the enjoym ent o f the I that separation becom es 
clear / In this separation, I recognize the other as other, im possible to to- 
talize, but one to meet openly and uniquely in his or her ow n enjoym ent 
(distinction) in the hospitality o f m y hom e and table, in com m union w ith  
my ow n unique humanity. Enjoyment alone does not presuppose ethical 
action, however. It only presupposes that I am free for the other, free as 
a differentiated self. Enjoyment Is preparatory (and remains continual) 
for ethics, but is not itself the confronted m om ent. The enjoying self is 
thrust into ethics in seeing the face o f the o th er/
The face o f the other for Fevinas is m etaphysical. It is beyond com - 
prehension, beyond totalization. It is beyond the ontological forniture o f  
my existence. It cannot be m oved and organized as I please. The face o f  
other in its nudity and uniqueness calls me out to him, to give all to him, 
to be hostage and com pletely responsible for him. “The face has turned 
to me -  and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to  
a system . ” و
4 It is here, anticipating our further discussion, that we see how theory and practice are 
linked for Levinas.
5 Peter Sedgwick continues this thought nicely: “In the light of this Levinas argues that the 
individuality of the individual is ‘enacted’ through enjoyment . . . .  The metaphysical Desire 
for the Other, in other words, is only possible for a being that is already separated from 
others.” Peter Sedgwick, Descartes to Derrida, Malden, Mass (Blackwell) 2001, 188.
6 “Only a subject that eats can be for-the-other, or can signify. Signification, the-one-for-the- 
other, has meaning only among beings of flesh and blood.” Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise 
Than Being or Beyond Essence, Pittsburgh (Duquesne University Press) 174 ,81 و .
7 “T) love aud to eujoy hy eatiug,
not drawn much attention from Western philosophers. By way of his phenomenology 
of terrestrial existence in light of an all-emhracing hedonism, Levinas shows that our 
search for happiness is not bad at all hut rather a necessary condition of the possibility 
of the self-possession through which the I acquires its autonomous substantiality. In 
this still-solitary dimension, the law of life is: Enjoy life as much as possihle.” Adriaan 
Peperzak, To the Other. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, West 
Lafayette, Ind. (Purdue University Press) 123 ,3 وو .
8 Levinas explains here how enjoyment leads to “heing-for-the-other.” tie  shows that 
enjoyment itself has passivity ahout it and it is this passivity that makes true ethical action 
possihle. Without passivity, ethics is turned into a program, hence into totalization. “It 
is the passivity of heing-for-another, which is possihle only in the form of giv ing  the very 
hread I eat. But this one has to first enjoy one’s hread, not in order to have the merit of 
giving it, hut in order to give it with one’s heart, to give oneself in giving it. Enjoyment 
is an ineluctahle moment of sensibility.” Levinas, Otherwise, 72.
و Levinas, Totality, 75.
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It ط  not, however, m asochistic enm eshm ent that Levinas desires, for 
I respond to the other from  my ow n subjective self, from my differenti- 
ated, distinct, enjoying self.10 w h e n  I see the face o f the other, however, 
I cannot turn away from the other, for the infinite has appeared. To deny  
it w ould  be to deny its possibility, m aking totality operative and tran- 
scendence im possible. If only totality is a possibility for humanity, ethics 
is im possible, for the other is only an item in my existence and cannot 
place a dem and upon me, cannot call me into res^ n sib ility . It is only as 
the transcendent that he can confront m e, for he is w holly  other from  
my ow n being, from  my ow n egoist, enjoying self. It is in this m om ent o f  
practice, o f ethical action, that theory, that philosophy is m ade know n to  
me. In action alongside the other, truth and objectivity appear.11
I see a face, though, and not a silhouette. There can be no pre-planned  
or pre-pared ethical actions. There can be no absolutes or foundational 
ethical obligations. To have such w ould  be to fall into totalization. I see a 
face, unique from  all others. In seeing it and seeing through it, I see all o f  
humanity. The other m ay be very familiar in m y day to day life (parent, 
child, spouse, colleague), but in seeing her as other, I see her as stranger. 
In her strangeness, I am opened to the w hole o f hum anity.^ This other’s 
humanity, this other’s face dem ands my response-ability. In this concrete 
m om ent o f seeing face to face, I m ust respond, I m ust act. In order to see 
her truly, to peer deep into the unique beauty o f her face, I m ust enter this 
m om ent open, prepared for ambiguity, prepared to discover anew reality 
and truth, and to experience as never before, again, the transcendent.
Infinity cannot be experienced w ithout action. Ethics cannot exist, for 
Levinas, w ithout respom ibility that m oves to substitution. M utuality is 
not enough. There m ust be an asym metrical connection between the I and 
other.*0 I m ust be w illing and ready to suffer for the other, to give “the 
very bread from  my m outh to the other.” w h e n  I m eet the other in such
10 “To endure this responsibility, 1 must, however, be someone: an independent being 
with an initiative and a concrete existence of its own. What are the conditions for 
this independence? ... Human selfhood is due to a specific way of commerce with the 
surrounding reality: to be an ego means to rise out of the elements and dominate them 
from an independent perspective, for example by eating or drinking.” Peperzak, To the 
Other, 23.
11 Levinas co n tin u es: “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic 
image it leaves me . . . .  The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to 
contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression ... . ” 
Levinas, Totality, 51.
12 “The other transcends the limits of (self-)consciousness and its horizon; the look and 
the voice that surprise me are ‘too much’ for my capacity of assimilation. In this sense, 
the other comes toward me as a total stranger and from a dimension that surpasses 
me. The otherness of the other reveals a dimension of ‘height’: he/she comes ‘from on 
high.’” Peperzak, To the Other, 20.
13 “It is ... an asymmetrical relation - 1 am summoned to a responsibility that is not dependent 
on reciprocity or equality but on ‘looking up’ to the other.” David F. Ford, Self and 
Salvation. Being Transformed, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1999, 37.
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a fashion, I am touched em otionally  by him  and I am w illing to suffer 
for him , to stand in his place, in the m ist o f his suffering and tragedy.14 
There is nothing I can deny the other.^
This does not, however, preempt or destroy m y subjective egoist enjoy- 
m ent, keeping me from  being a self. Rather, it is in this radical respon- 
sibility that I discover my true humanity, shaken loose from  the dusty  
ropes o f self-centered m onism . It is only in being-for-the-other that I can  
be m e, the enjoying self.16 “To realize my responsibility for the Other, I 
m yself m ust be free and independent؛ but the sense o f my selfhood is my  
being-for-the-Other. ”17
For Tevinas, in this ethical interaction o f substitution w ith the other, 
language becom es o f great im portance. It is language that bridges the 
I and the other.18 “ [T]he relation between the same and the other ... is 
language.”19 I cannot act for the other, I cannot stand-in for the other, 
if I do not understand w hat it m eans to be the other. I m ust a llow  her 
to teach m e.20 I can only escape totalization by m eeting the other in 
conversation, in language, in the “saying.” This event o f language w ill
14 “T>be-for-an©ther, despite ©neself, but in interrupting the for-©neself, is to take the bread 
out of one’s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting. The 
for-another characteristic of sensibility is enacted already in the enjoying and savoring, 
if we can express ourselves in this way.” Levinas, Otherwise, 56.
15 “The way the other imposes its enigmatic irreducibility and nonrelativity or absoluteness 
is by means of a command and a prohibition: You are not allowed to kill me; you must 
accord me a place under the sun and everything that is necessary to live a truly human 
life. This demands not only the omission of criminal behavior but simultaneously a 
positive dedication: the other’s facing me makes me responsible for him/her, and this 
responsibility has no limits.” Peperzak, To the Other, 22.
16 Levinas upholds that in a true relationship of substitution, the ل and the other are upheld 
in their own unique and distinct humanity, and one’s egoist self is not exploded. “An 
exposure to the other, it is signification, is signification itself, the-one-for-the-other to the 
point of substitution, but a substitution in separation, that is, responsibility.” Levinas, 
Otherwise, 54. He continues this thought: “In substitution my being that belongs to me 
and not to another is undone, and it is through this substitution that I am not ‘another,’ 
but me.” Ibid., 127.
17 Peperzak, To the Other, 25.
18 “How are the selves related in the pluralism which resists totality? The main way is by 
language, which can relate across the ‘abyss of separation’ and at the same time confirm 
the separation. Levinas even says that ‘the epiphany of the face is wholly language.’ 
Language is not first of all about a content to be communicated but is rooted in the 
orientation to the other, in sincerity and frankness, and in responsibility answerable to 
the other.” Ford, $elf, 57.
19 Levinas, Totality, 59.
20 ‘Ho approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at 
each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore 
to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have 
the idea of infinity . . . .  The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic 
relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching 
[enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and 
brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the 
face is produced.” Levinas, Totality, 51.
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call me deep, not in simple understanding o f the other, but into incar- 
national substitution for the other.21 In hearing, seeing, and conversing, 
the other’s infinity w ill call me to stand in for her com pletely. We m ust 
allow  language to bridge our w orlds, to inform  us and m ove us deeper 
in com m itm ent for one another. One informs me o f w hat it is to be the 
other by “saying” SO.22 In the back and forth drawing out o f the say- 
ing m om ent that informs me and draws me deeper into substitution, in 
conversation, I realize that I am “elect . ” لا  I am the elect and chosen one 
to stand in for this o th e r s
In this section I have used w ords from Levinas like “transcendence” 
and “m etaphysical” (Levinas also uses “epiphany” often), but it w ould  
not be appropriate to end this section w ithout touching m ore specifically 
on just w hat Levinas m eans by transcendence, or better, h ow  one expe- 
riences or com es in contact w ith  the transcendent or m etaphysical, i.e., 
God. For Levinas, discussing God is unfeasible. God is transcendent, so 
far outside o f being that it is im possible (we have no language) to speak  
of G od.25 This im possibility keeps God from any risk o f being totalized. 
The hum an, however, can still experience the m etaphysical, can still ex- 
perience transcendence. This is possible through the face o f the other. In 
the ethical act, the hum an partakes in the d iv in e d  “Levinas asks in w hich  
concrete experience this structure can realize itself. H is response is no
21 “Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me and tbe 
Otber, the radical separation in transcendence wbicb prevents the reconstitution of 
totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a 
conversation consists in recognizing In the Otber a rigbt over tbis egoism, justifying 
oneself.” Ibid., 40.
22 “Saying is a denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and chosen; 
that is, it is an exposedness to the other wbere no slipping away is possible.” Levinas, 
Otherwise, 50. Levinas explains here what the conversation (“saying”) can do philosophically 
and bow it works to connect us to the other.
23 “‘Face’ is the word Levinas chooses to indicate the alterity of the Other forbidding me to 
exercise my narcissistic violence. ‘Language’ is another expression of the same nucleus of 
meaning if it is understood as spoken language or discourse and not as a text detacbed 
from its autbor. Tbe Other regards me and speaks to me; you are my interlocutor; 
Tbe face speaks.’ Tbis is the concrete way in wbicb 1 am in relation with the infinite.” 
Feperzak, To the Other, 64.
24 Feperzak explains furtber what Levinas means by election: “I have been chosen, neither 
by myself nor by another’s will or decision but by some thing or some no-thing that is 
present through the Other who shows me his/her face. I have been chosen to he responsible 
for anybody whom 1 sball meet. 1 cannot refuse tbis election, for it has appointed me 
as an irreplaceable servant who cannot put this burden on others.” Ibid., 28.
25 “Our language about or to God should be in agreement with the relation of me to the 
Other, who is the only ‘place’ where God is revealed. Only from tbis perspective can 
one approach God prudently and respectfully. Not, however, simply as an enlargement 
of the buman Other; for God is not an other Autrui, but still other tban the buman 
Other.” Ibid., 35.
26 “Levinas wifi state ... that the existence of the buman other, because of his/her absolute 
otberness (or infinity) is the only possible revelation of God.” Ibid., 109, n.53. “Anotber 
looking at me ... signifies the ideal and the divine.” Ibid., I l l ,  n.62.
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longer sim ply the traditional one o f the Greeks or Christian theologians, 
w ho identify the absolutely Other w ith  the unique C od above finite be- 
ings, but the other hum an. This is not to say that God is suppressed or 
abolished . ” لا  Tevinas plaees ethies w ithin  the bodily, and the transeendent 
w ithin  the w orld .28
We m ust be eautious, however. The other does not beeom e G od for 
Tevinas, nor is G od m ystieally found som ehow  beeom ing the other, as 
if helping the other is helping C od or loving the other is loving God. 
Rather, the other remains the other, and our eonneetion  to the other is 
eonneetion to the other only. We eannot allow  our ethies to be distraeted  
by our theology. To “love the sinner, but hate the sin ” is in and o f itself 
totalization  and, ironieally, destroys the possibility o f transeendenee. 
Tevinas explains.
The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. A relation with 
the Transcendent free from all captivation by tbe Transcendent is a social 
relation. It is bere that the Transcendent, infinitely otber, solicits us and ap- 
peals to us. The proximity of the Otber, the proximity of the neigbbor, is in 
being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute presence (that 
is, disengaged from every relation), which expresses itself. His very epipbany 
consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow, 
and the orphan.2؟
W ith som e o f the major pillars o f Levinas’s thought n ow  in plaee, w e ean  
turn to diseussing his disdain for theology.
Levinas’s Critique o f T heology
Levinas’s basie eritieism  o f theology is that although it speaks o f the 
m etaphysieal and elaims it reeeives its data from  the transeendent, it is not 
m etaphysieal. Philosophieally, he elaims that for theology to be m etaphysi- 
cal is an antilogy. T heology is totalizing. Its pursuit is to categorize the 
other. Through cognition it elaim s w ho and where God is. This project in 
and o f itself m akes transeendenee im possible, ironically m aking the th eo­
27 Ihid., 61.
28 “The ‘atheism’ of the will, as a necessary condition for ego’s independence, goes together 
with true religion. The question of how ‘the Other’ must be understood receives an answer 
in several formulas by which Levinas tries to explain that the relation to the human 
Other and the revelation to God coincide completely and without fail. The only way of 
having a relation with God -  so is his conviction -  is to respond to the interpellation of 
the human face, to be good. This correspondence is neither a form of participation nor 
a parallelism between two worlds; God does not incarnate himself in human beings, 
but there is no other relation to God possible than the generous approach of the human 
Other in his/her misery. Autrui is the absolute that orients the world and its history.” 
Ibid., 144.
29 Levinas, Totality, 78.
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logical task superfluous at best and destructive at w o r s t . “M etaphysics 
is enacted in ethical relations. W ithout the signification they draw from  
ethics, theological concepts remain em pty and form al f r a m e w o r k s . T h e  
theological task is to look  ontologically  at God, outlining G od, asserting 
w hat is possible for God and w hat is not. T heology asserts that there is 
a divine drama underway, and in asserting such, the freedom  of the hu- 
m an other is lost in the totalizing project o f the divine. Levinas fears that 
w e, that hum anity in our theology, have given G od ontology that is too  
similar to our ow n ,^  m aking it possible for God to be possessed, keep- 
ing God from being an enjoying subject.^ In other w ords, for Levinas, 
theology im prisons God in the reality o f the “said” rather than in the 
m oving, acting, unthem atized reality o f the “saying.” For Levinas, God  
exists not in the noun but the verb.34
30 Ford explains further what Levinas’s objections are to theology: “Tbeology, be says, 
thematizes or objectifies what it should not; it is mythological, or suggests tbat tbere is a 
divine drama in progress in wbicb people are participants, often unwittingly; it suggests 
that it is possible to participate directly in or have cognitive or emotional access to tbe life 
of God; it finds intrinsic links between human nature and the divine; it tends to confuse 
creation with causality or to conceptualize creation in ontological terms; it makes ontology 
absolute, with God as the supreme being and therefore inevitably totalitarian; it argues 
analogically from the world to God; it signifies God in terms of presence, action, efficacy 
in the world; above all, its alliance with ontology conspires against doing justice to an 
ethics wbicb resists the assimilation of the other person to oneself and one’s overview, and 
which finds in the face to face an unsurpassable imperative directness and immediacy.” 
David F. Ford, On Substitution, in: Facing the Other. The Etbics of Emmanuel Fevinas, 
ed. Sean Hand, Richmond Surrey (Cuzon) 123 ,6 وو . Some of Levinas’s prohlems we 
wifi he unahle to pacify, yet that is not the pursuit of tbis article. Instead, hy taking bis 
critique seriously, I intend to sbow bow his pbilosopbical metbod is helpful to practical 
theology.
31 Levinas, Totality, 79.
32 Ford states nicely Levinas’s purpose in relation to God and theology: “Levinas suggests that 
the main purpose for the book [Otherwise than Being] is ‘to bear a God uncontaminated 
hy B eing’, and tbrougb the test tbeology emerges as a discourse that colindes witb the 
contamination.” Eord, Self, 50.
33 “Tbeological language rings untrue or hecomes mystical . . . .  As ontological language, 
it helongs to the fahric of interests that dominate the state and its religions parallel, the 
cburcb. Being incapahle of disinterestedness, theology impedes transcendence. If seen as 
an ohject opposite to a tbinking suhject that desires knowledge, God is the fulfillment of 
interested (or ‘erotic’) need ... not the Ahsolute to wbicb true desire refers . . . .  Tbis God 
is the seducer wbo apes the infinite; he is an enemy of morality and a principle of hate. 
The nonontologically understood God is nonpresent: be is not a tbeme, not even in the 
form of a ‘Tbou’ witb wbom a dialogue would he possihle. He cannot he known hecause 
as noematic correlate, be would immediately he annibilated in the totalizing knowledge 
of tbe suhject. Even the question, ‘Does God exist?’ testifies to an irréligions attitude .. . .  
The question helongs in the spbere wbere interests, security, utility, projects and results, 
proof and calculations, totality and conatus are at bome. The God wbo is hrougbt to 
speecb there is not strong enougb to overcome the deatb of God that cbaracterizes our 
times.” Feperzak, To the Otber, 225.
34 “The limits of the present in wbicb infinity hetrays itself hreak up. Infinity is heyond the 
scope of the unity of transcendental apperception, cannot he assemhled into a present, 
and refuses heing recollected. Tbis negation of the present and of representation finds its
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The “other” w ho is them atized and totalized in the theologieal task  
is not just God, but also the hum an other. If one lives and m oves in the 
w orld w ith  a eategorized God, one w ill inevitably eategorize his or her 
neighbor. D estroying G od’s transeendenee w ill result in the destruetion o f  
the transcendence o f the hum an other. W ith this transcendence destroyed  
(or ignored), ethics becom es im possible. N either G od nor the hum an other 
is free to place a dem and upon m e, free to elect me for action. Both God  
and the other becom e static, allow ing me to be for m yself rather than  
for the other.
Tevinas suggests that the m ost theistic stance one can take is to live as 
an atheist. This frees one from  idolatry and allow s for ethical action on  
behalf o f the other.^ W ithout such a stance, w hen the other approaches 
me I am not free to give m yself to him, but m ust stop and contem plate 
w hat G od w ants and where God is. This puts God over against the other, 
keeping me from respom ibility for him , keeping God static, keeping the 
other from m eeting me from on high, from being him self m etaphysical. 
Tevinas pleads w ith  us to look  for the transcendent am ongst us, w ithin  
the inter-personal, for only here w ill ethics be possible. If transcendence is 
locked outside o f our sensibility, outside o f our experiencing it, our only  
option  is to step back from  the w orldly reality o f res^ n sib ility , ignoring  
the other w hile them atizing the beyond. Tevinas states,
The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation with the 
M etaphysical is an ethical behavior and not tbeology, not a tbematization, be 
it a knowledge by analogy, of tbe attributes of God. God rises to bis supreme 
and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men. The direct 
comprebension of God is impossible for a look directed upon him, not because 
our intelligence is limited, but because the relation with infinity respects the 
total Transcendence of the other w ithout being bewitched by it, and because 
our possibility of welcoming him in man goes further than the comprehension 
that thematizes and encompasses its object.^
positive form in proximity, msponsibility and substitution. This makes it different from 
the propositions of negative theology ... . In proximity, in signification, in my giving of 
signs, already the Infinite speaks through the witness I bear of it, in my sincerity, in my 
saying without said, preoriginary saying which is said in the mouth of the very one that 
receives the witness.” Levinas, Otherwise, 151.
35 Ford gives us a helpful hint on how to read Levinas’s perspective at this point, helpful 
because it keeps us from being too defensive: “To read Levinas with the prophets of 
biblical Israel in mind is to be reminded of two of their main themes which am inseparably 
interwoven: rejection of idolatry and passionate concern for right living with other 
people. Levinas comes as near as possible to identifying the two, and his ‘ethics as first 
philosophy’ is a rigourous critique of the way in which ‘idols’ of various sorts have so 
fascinated and dominated the Western intellectual tradition and the civilisation which it 
has helped to form that the result has been a devastation propensity for violence, murder 
and war.” Ford, Self, 46.
36 Levinas, Totality, 78.
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Levinas’s concerns are w ell-founded and m ust not be ignored. From a 
Christian theological perspective, however, this begs the question whether a 
Christological, trinitarian reading w ould  not address m any o f his concerns, 
and address them  in a w ay that allow s for his m ethod, for his philosophy, 
to stay intact. W ith this challenge before us, w e w ill turn to practical 
theologian Ray Anderson, seeing h ow  his understanding o f theology dif- 
fers from  the theology that Levinas addresses and c r i t iq u es .
A M ove to Fractical Theology:
M inistry Leading to a Trinitarian T heology
For Anderson, Christian theology is inseparable from Christian ministry. 
All theology m ust be w orked out in the held o f m inisterial practice. H e 
asserts, “M inistry cannot be construed solely as the practical application  
(or technique) w hich m akes theological know ledge relevant and effective. 
T heological activity m ust emerge out o f m inistry and for the sake o f min- 
istry if it is to be in accordance w ith  the divine m odality. The ‘practice,’ 
of ministry, then, is not only the appropriate context for doing theological 
thinking, it is itself intrinsically a theological activity.”^  Anderson can 
m ake this assertion because o f his robust understanding o f the incarna- 
tion o f Jesus Christ. The ministry o f C od to the w orld  has com e in its 
fullness in the hum anity o f Jesus Christ. The concrete historical ministry  
of Jesus Christ reveals to humanity, unm ediated, the nature and person  
of C od .^  This is not totalizing but personal. C od m eets hum anity in the 
shared social reality. Anderson states,
Revelation does not exist between God and man as an abstract entity which is 
something else than either God or man, but exists as God himself exists -  per- 
sonally and concretely in relation with man. The possibility of knowing and 
expressing the Word of God in human thought-forms and in historical events 
fellows upon the actuality of that event in the incarnate life of Jesus . . . .  If the 
Word of God stands only as an abstract or existential possibility, separated 
from the historical context in which it originally came, then ... ministry ... will 
have no ... content.”39
Jesus asserts, “W hoever has seen me has seen the Father” and “The Fa- 
ther and I are o n e .”40 The transcendent has n ow  becom e historical and
37 Ray Anderson, A Theology for Ministry, in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed. 
Ray Anderson, Edinburgh (T & T Clark) 17 , و7و .
38 “A Christological perspective of ministry is that of ministry which has been accomplished 
and which continues to be accomplished through the Roly Spirit, who indwells and 
actualizes the life of the Church. To say that actuality precedes possibility, is to say that 
God has actually given and upheld both sides of the ministry of the Word [which is 
revelation and reconciliation].” Ibid., 17.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 John 14:9 and 10:30 (NRSV).
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worldly. It remains eom pletely other, w hile beeom ing eom pletely for. The 
Christian church confesses that C od n ow  has a hum an face.41
W ith Jesus now  resurrected, his m inistry continues to be found only  
in the historical, for death has been conquered allow ing for continuity  
from  century to century. In the trinitarian confession  o f the church, the 
Spirit o f Christ continues Jesus’ bodily ministry, for Jesus is alive. It is 
this confession  o f a living Christ, a m inistering Christ, that results in our 
theology being m ore than ontological claim s but instead gives equal prior- 
ity to the ontic. It is the experience o f the ontic that shakes our theology  
loose from  sealed containers, calling us to look  again .^
The worshipping com m unity partakes in the Spirit that propels both the 
individual and com m unity out into the w orld  to do as its Lord does, to  
give itself to and for the w orld , to minister to its neighbor.43 The Christian  
is called to find Christ in the w orld , to find him , as Barth states, w ith  his 
fellow s,44 to find Jesus suffering for and loving the Other.45 To partake 
in Christ, the Christian m ust partake in the life o f the hum an other. In 
Christ, revelation and reconciliation are indivisibility linked. Anderson  
therefore states, “Because the divine W ord and the hum an response are 
reciprocally related, so that one cannot be considered apart from  the 
other, revelation and reconciliation participate in the same fundam ental 
paradigm .”46 This inseparability forces us deep into the hum an situation to
41 “Jesus’ facing of others is in line with his facing of God. It is above all about coraunicating 
the good news of this God who is radically different from the God represented by most 
people’s beliefs, fears, expectations and practices.” Ford, Self, 179.
42 Clifford Green states further: “If the proper question of Christology is ‘who is Jesus Christ?’ 
this is a question which can only be asked to the Christ who is present. Christology is 
not concerned with an ideal of Christ nor with the historical influence of Christ, but 
with the resurrected Christ, the living God, who is really present. Furthermore, Christ 
is present as person not in isolation but only in relation to persons.” Clifford j. Green, 
Bonhoeffer. A Theology of Sociality, Grand Rapids (William B. Eerdmanns Fublishing, 
1999, 209.
43 “The Holy Spirit unites the doing of ministry to the ministry which has already been 
accomplished in Christ, establishing a reciprocity between dogma and experientially 
discloses and disciplines.” Anderson, A Theology, 8.
44 “ff we see Him alone, we do not see Him at all. ff we see Him, we see with and around 
Him in ever-widening circles His disciples, the people, His enemies and the countless 
millions who have not yet heard His name. We see Him as theirs, determined by them 
and for them, belonging to each and every one of them . . . .  What emerges in it is a 
supreme I wholly determined by and to the Thou.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 
III.2, Edinburgh (T & T Clark) 1960, 216.
45 “The community does not speak with words alone, ff speaks by the very fact of ffs 
existence in the world; by its characteristic attitude to world problems; and, moreover 
and especially, by its silent service to all the handicapped, weak, and needy in the world, 
ff speaks, finally, hy the simple fact that ff prays for the world, ff does all this hecause this 
is the purpose of ffs summons hy the Word of God.” Karl Barth, The Flace of Theology, 
in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed. Ray Anderson, Edinhurgh ( 1 ^ 1  Clark) 
1979,44.
46 Anderson, A Theology, 12.
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hear openly from  the other, to see the dem and o f the other as the demand  
of Christ. Christian m inistry m ust give itself fully to the other w ith  no  
reservation, for Christian m inistry is the m inistry o f Jesus w ho gives all 
for humanity. It is only in this eonstruet o f being for the other that I am  
w ith Christ. Thus, it is only here that I ean do theology. It is a theology  
that is never distraeted from the faee o f the other, but in seeing, hearing, 
and responding to the other, I diseover anew (or again) the reality o f Cod. 
In the face o f the other I see the face o f Christ, never them atizing it as 
such, but rather allow ing the other to remain him  or herself.
T heology m ust be done in dialogue w ith  this face, this face that is 
the other w ho is my historical concrete neighbor, unique and particular. 
Surely there w ill be continuity to the “past story” o f biblical revelation, 
for it is the spirit o f Christ w ho is present in my theological ministerial 
act w ith  the other.^ Yet even this “past story” n ow  breathes. It is m ore 
than categorized history. M ore than the “sa id ,” it is the “saying,” for it 
is not over, but continues to confront me, calling me to understand anew  
in light o f this stranger w ho is n ow  near.48 This malees theology and 
ethics inseparable, for I discover and partake in the theological only in 
my obedience to the ethical.4؟ One is left to w onder if Levinas’s thought 
m ight not com plem ent the foregoing^  w hen he says.
47 “ [W]hen theological thinking is practiced in abstraction from tbe Cburcb in ministry, 
it inevitably becomes as much unapplied and irrelevant as pure. When the theological 
mind of the minister is being educated primarily through experience, an ad boc theology 
emerges wbicb owes as mucb (or more) to metbodological and pragmatic concerns as to 
dogma. Tbe task of working out a theology for ministry begins properly with the task of 
identifying the nature and place of ministry itself.” Anderson, A Tbeology, 7. 1 cannot 
make tbeology only dogmatic categorization, nor can 1 refuse to think theoretically 
and tbeologically if Jesus Cbrist is the criterion for ministry, for in His person tbey are 
united.
48 “As Cbrist’s own ministry is unfolded and proclaimed, the Cburcb discovers its own 
ministry, and its members their own particular ministry. Christ continually discloses his 
ministry in concrete situations. This disclosure is the source of all true innovation and 
creativity in ministry. Tbus, dogma does not stifle but stimulates creativity.” Ibid., 8.
49 “As a theological discipline, the hermeneutical task of the Cburcb is to continue to search 
out and seek to be conformed to the hermeneutical structure of revelation itself, as given 
in Holy Scripture. Thus, the ministry of the Cburcb necessarily involves theological 
reflection and a correction of its own inevitable tendencies to create ministry for its own 
justification.” Ibid., 19. This warning is avoided if theology sees its tasks as incarnational, 
and thus inseparable from ethics.
50 Here David Ford shows the different perspectives of theologian Eberhard Jüngel and 
Levinas: “ff would he possihle to ameliorate the tension if Jüngel did not affirm one 
person, Jesus Christ, as tbe incarnation of God and therefore as tbe particular one who 
is there for all otbers. As it is, the extremism of Levinas seeing ‘me’ suhstituting for 
all confronts Jüngel’s extremism of seeing ‘Jesus Christ’ suhstituting for all.” Eord, On 
Substitution, 32. Tbis quote shows wbere Levinas would have a prohlem whb earlier 
Cbristological discussion. Yet wbat 1 am proposing, following Levinas, is that one is 
personally called to complete substitution for tbe Other. Unlike Levinas, 1 am asserting 
that 1 can only receive tbe power to do so (and to keep the act from heing some kind 
masochistic self-fulfillment) in following Jesus Christ wbo meets me and partakes whb
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The w ork of justice -  the uprightness of the face to face -  is necessary in or- 
der that the breach that leads to God be produced . . . .  Hence metapbysics is 
enacted wbere tbe social relation is enacted -  in our relations witb men. Tbere 
can be no “knowledge” of God separated from the relationsbip with men.
The O tber is the very locus of metapbysical trutb, and is indispensable for my 
relation with God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The Otber is not 
the incarnation of God, but precisely by bis face, in which be is disincarnate, 
is the manifestation of the beigbt in wbicb God is revealed. It is our relations 
with men, wbicb describe a field of research hardly glimpsed at ... that give 
to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.51
We have had this Christologieal eonversation m ostly behind Tevinas’s 
baek. We m ust n ow  turn our eonversation m ore direetly to him. Ford 
states w hat m ay be Tevinas’s ultimate eoneern in sueh a Christologieal 
reading, “In the com plex o f responsibilities, w hat worries Tevinas m ost 
about the c o s -c e n te r e d  position  ... is that som ehow  Christianity involves 
a shifting o f re s^ n s ib ility  on to that man on the cross, and an infinite 
pardon w hich eneourages ir re s^ m ib ility .”^  To show  that this need not 
be, I turn now  to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, putting him in a more direct con- 
versation w ith  Tevinas. Before this is possible, however, it is im portant to  
see h ow  Bonhoeffer can be understood as a practical theologian.
Bonhoeffer as a Representative P ractica l  T h e o l o g ia n
Dietrich Bonhoeffer began to write his doctoral dissertation in theology  
at the University o f Berlin at the age o f nineteen. H e w ould  finish it at 
tw enty-one. The project (which becam e his first book, Sanctorum Com -  
munio)  discussed the em pirical reality o f the Christian church, putting  
sociological theory and dogm atic theology in dialogue. The dissertation  
w as not inspired by his ow n attendance and participation in the church  
(he rarely if ever w ent), but cam e from his observation w hile on holiday  
in R om e o f the pilgrims m aking their w ay to the Vatican. From his obser­
me in this act. Ford continues giving us further clues to what Levinas’s response might 
be to this Christologieal reading: “Levinas is just as hostile as Jüngel to what they both 
see as the traditional theological concept of analogy leading to a negative apophatic 
theology, but he does not entertain Jüngel’s singular event of the incarnation through 
which to construct an alternative. Faith in the event ofthe incarnation (interpreted through 
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ) is for Jüngel the source of confidence in the 
capacitiation of our language ever anew in parabolic forms. ‘Similarity’ for him means 
the inexhaustible expressibility of the mystery of this event, God genuinely being offered 
in human expression. Levinas, for all his more agonistic and self-deconstructing language 
and his refusal to talk of similarity, yet pivots his philosophy around a proximity, a 
coming near, an approach which is also inexhaustibly fruitful.” Ford, Self, 78.
51 Levinas, Totality, 79.
52 Ford, Self, 59.
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vation o f this practice, he ^ a s  m oved to construct a theory.53 w h a t  w as 
the church and how  w as its dogm atic doctrinal understanding connected  
to it empirical sociological reality? w h ere  w as Christ concretely found  
w ithin  it? H o w  could  this be justified sociologically? One today m ay be 
tem pted w ith  good  reason to call this a practical theological project, both  
because o f its empirical starting point and its interdisciplinary m ethodol- 
ogy. B onhoeffer’s project began w ith w hat Browning calls the starting 
point and central m ove o f practical theology, asking, w h a t  is going on  
here? W hat is happening?^
Bonhoeffer spent the academ ic year o f 1 3 0 و  in N ew  York City at 
U nion T heological Seminary, where he w as influenced greatly by fellow  
student Frank Fisher, an African-Am erican. Fisher exposed  Bonhoeffer 
firsthand both to the hardships o f Blacks in H arlem  (and elsewhere) and 
to the vibrant worship style in A fr in -A m e r ic a n  storefront churches. 
W hen Bonhoeffer returned to Cermany, he w as changed. H e w as n ow  
m ore interested in pastoral theological thought than system atic or philo- 
sophical theology. After returning from N ew  York, Bonhoeffer knew  m ore 
poignantly that theology could only be discovered in the practice and 
action o f ministry. “Can theologians think, speak, and write theologically  
unless they really live in the decisive history o f hum anity w hich is n ow  
being made? Dare w e speak o f the activity o f the living C od in history  
unless w e ourselves are part o f that action? W hat w ill w e be able to say 
about the ethical, political, and psychic issues o f hum anity today unless 
w e live in this psycho-social reality?
Bonhoeffer did not abandon his developed theology o f sociality but saw  
m ore clearly h ow  it related to practice, using it as an arrow to strike at the 
heart o f the political situation facing Cerm any and the Christian church. 
Fastor Bonhoeffer n ow  put all his energy into constructing theological 
concepts that addressed Christian practice and action in the real w orld , 
a w orld  that calls for action and res^ n sib ility , i.e., for ethics.^  H is next 
projects addressed obedience in discipleship (The C os t  o f  D isc ip leship ),
53 Practical theology is often understood as interdisciplinary in nature. Clifford Green shows 
here how Bonhoeffer’s work from the start was interdisciplinary. “The interdisciplinary 
method in Sanctorum Communio, then, is identical with that employed in the next work, 
Act and Being. Bonhoeffer appreciates and appropriates insights found in non-theological 
disciplines. But he is perfectly clear and confident about his method as a theologian. The 
ultimate criterion is the revelation in Christ. This combination of theological confidence, 
which manifests his indebtedness to Barth, and intellectual openness, which reflects his 
Berlin upbringing and education, is refreshing indeed in the theological scene of the late 
1920 in Germany.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 27.
54 Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals, 
Minneapolis (Fortress Press) 1991, ch. 3.
55 Green, Bonhoeffer, 293.
56 “This integration of theology and life is partly what Bonhoeffer had in mind when he 
wrote of finding Christ at the center of life in the world, of sharing the sufferings of 
God, and of learning to have faith hy living completely in our history.” Ihid., 294.
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the praetiees o f Christian eom m unity (Prayer B ook  o f  the Bible  and Life  
Together), and ethies speeifieally (Ethics). T h eology for Bonhoeffer was 
eonstruetive from the start, and its m om entum  grew as his years and writ- 
ing progressed. Seeing his theology as interdiseiplinary, praetiee-oriented, 
m inistry-foeused, and in ter^etively-direeted, it seems befitting to elaim  
him as a practical theologian.
Bonhoeffer in Conversation with Tevinas
T heology and Christology need not lead us away from  substitutionary  
ethies, as Tevinas fears. Instead, they have the potential to lead us deeper 
into sueh aetion, to engender responsible ethies for-the-other. We w ill see 
this possibility in B onhoeffer’s theology o f sociality.
Ethics for Tevinas is not based ontologically  in a totality o f right 
and w rong, but is discovered in the soeial interaetion o f I and the other, 
of the one being eom pletely for-the-other. Bonhoeffer him self begins his 
theological project elsewhere than striet theologieal diseussions o f on to ؛- 
ogy, elsewhere than epistem ology. H e begins, like Tevinas, in the social 
situation, asking in the context o f this social reality, w h o  is Jesus Christ? 
W here is Jesus Christ? H o w  then m ust I act?^
Eor Bonhoeffer as for Tevinas, ethics is em bedded w ithin  his anthro- 
pology. To be hum an is to act ethically. The “I” for Bonhoeffer is just 
as distinct as the enjoying I o f Tevinas. The individual m ust be an egoist 
for the possibility o f ethics for Tevinas. For Bonhoeffer, he m ust exist in 
a dynam ic relationahty where he is both open to and closed to the other. 
For the I to be open to another, it m ust discover itself in its distinction, 
in its closedness. For one to be open, one m ust be closed. She m ust drag 
her foot in the sand, form ing a line and stating, “This is me and that is 
y o u .” One m ust k now  herself as an I, a subject different from  all others.^  
Bonhoeffer states, “Thus the ‘openness’ o f the person dem ands ‘closedness’ 
as a correlative, or one could not speak o f openness at all . ” و
57 “Theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation between God and tbe creature in 
terms of ontology. It presupposes the logical privilege of totality, as a concept adequate 
to being. Tbus it runs up against the difficulty of understanding that an infinite being 
would border on or tolerate something outside of itself, or that a free being would send its 
roots into the infinity of a God.” Levinas, Totality, 293. It seems to me that Bonboeffer’s 
theology avoids the overempbasis on ontology of which Levinas accuses the discipline.
58 “The otber person is a real Grenze to the I, a limit to the dominating ambitions of the 
self; the other person is also, as embodying the Word of forgiveness ab extra, the promise 
and possibility of the self’s liberation into a new existence . . . .  It is only because Cbrist 
is present as person tbat the self acknowledges the other as a genuine person and not 
as an entity or merely extant tbing.” Green, Bonboeffer, 89.
59 Dietrich Bonboeffer, Sanctorum Communio. A Theological Study of the Sociology of 
the Cburcb, Minneapolis (Fortress Fress) 1963, 74.
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For ض0ظ  Levinas and Bonhoeffer, philosophy or theology begins 
w ith a distinct and differentiated self. For Levinas, the ground for fois 
distinction is the irrefutable phenom enon o f the self. For Bonhoeffer, it 
is p h n o m en o lo g ica l, but also theological.^  In foe C hristological under- 
standing o f Christ as the new  humanity, w hich confronts and opposes all 
that dehum anizes, the hum an is given back the self. H e is now  free to be 
him self, free from  the bondage o f both the self and the other, n ow  free 
to enter into free relationality w ifo  the other,61 or in Levinas’s w ords, to  
partake in transcendent infinity.
This dif fe re n t ia ted  self leads both L e v in a s  and Bonhoeffer to the t r a m  
scendent, into relationship w ifo  the m etaphysical.^  Levinas locates both  
the philosophical and the m etaphysical w ithin  the w orld. In encountering  
the face o f the other, one encounters the transcendent. Bonhoeffer asserts 
m uch the sam e.^ The transcendence o f C od is n ow  a historical transcend- 
ence, for it has em bedded itself in the hum anity o f Jesus Christ,^ the
60 Green continues my point: “The phenomenology of transcendence in sociality is that 
Christ present as person in the other encounters me in the Word; the Word questions my 
existence by asking me about my love for the neighbor. [...] The present Christ encounters 
tbe self wbose false social existence is witbin a solidarity of isolated selves, eacb being a 
cor curvum in se, beau turned in upon itself (Tutber). His Word of judgment and grace 
liberates the egocentric self for the love of the neigbbor, thus creating the mutuality 
of freedom and love for one another in the community of the new bumanity.” Green, 
Bonboeffer. 216.
61 “Two fundamental assertions are being made in this theological view of human social 
relationships. First, God is the one wbo establisbes the otber as You in relation to the 
self, tbus constituting the self as a person. Second, God is the divine You wbo encounters 
the self in the etbical limit and claim of the buman ‘other,’ ‘God is a You for us, that is, 
active will standing over against us.’ Tbese two assertions cannot really be separated; 
since transcendence is to be understood in terms of sociality, tbey are two aspects of the 
one relationsbip.” Ibid., 36.
62 “ [T]he person is willed by God, in concrete vitality, wholeness, and uniqueness as an 
ultimate unity. Social relations must be understood, then, as purely interpersonal and 
building on the uniqueness and separateness of persons . . . .  Thus the way to the other 
person’s You is the same as the way to the divine You, eitber tbrougb acknowledgment or 
rejection.” Bonboeffer, Sanctorum, 55. This statement sbows bis connection to Levinas in 
seeing the human botb as distinct (making responsibility possible) and transcendent.
63 “A God invisible means not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. 
Ethics is the spiritual optics.” Levinas, Totality, 78. Bonhoeffer would agree.
64 Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas have a kind of atheistic theism. We have discussed ahove 
how Levinas has placed the transcendence of God so far outside of human contact and 
manipulation that be claims no correlation hetween God’s heing and our own. Ford has 
called Levinas a prophetic voice, like tbose in the Old Testament, speaking out against 
idolatry. Bonboeffer also feared a kind of theistic idolatry in which God hecame a stop 
gap. One of bis most puzzling and intriguing statements from Tegel prison is addressed 
to this concern. He states: “And we cannot he bonest unless we recognize that we bave 
to live in the world esti deus non duretur [even if there were no Godj. And tbis is just 
what we do recognize -  hefore God! God himself compels us to recognize it ... . God 
would bave us know that we must live as men who manage our lives witbout him. The 
God wbo lets us live in the world without the working bypotbesis of God is the God 
before whom we stand continually. Before God and with God we live without God.”
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hum anity o f G od .^  The spirit o f Christ, the H oly  Spirit, is n ow  present in 
the soeial relationality o f the ehureh in the w orld , o f the individual Chris- 
tian and his neighbor.^ In eneountering my neighbor, I am eneountering  
Christ, the transeendent, for God has bound the divine self to humanity. 
The reeoneiliation o f hum anity to God is universal.^  w hen ever I m eet 
my neighbor in his d istinetion,^  affirming and respeeting the boundary 
that separates the other from  me and affirming his ow n enjoying self, I 
m eet Christ . غ و W h e n  I refuse to totalize the o th e r  but stand v u ln e r a b le  in 
the w onder o f the other’s infinity, I m eet Christ.™ This is not beeause the 
other’s I is transubstantiated into Christ. Instead, in m utual relationality  
I partake, as does the other on my behalf, in the ministry o f Christ that 
is giving unique partieularity to the subjeet in the eom m unity o f the new
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, New York (Macmillan Publishing 
Co.) 1360 ,53 و . Bonboeffer’s understanding of God, much like Levinas’s, does not keep 
us from action, suffering, and service, but encounters God only in it, only there revealing 
God’s wonder.
65 “For Bonhoeffer, then, transcendence does not refer to an inaccessible otherness or 
heyondness of God; it refers to the present Christ. But the present Christ is ‘other,’ ‘outside’ 
tbe self, in sucb a way tbat be cannot be drawn into tbe dominating power of tbe self- 
sufficient ego. It is as person tbat Christ is ‘other,’ ‘outside’ tbe self. Christology states 
its presupposition about “transcendence, namely, that the Logos is person. This human 
being is the transcendent.” [...] But the Word embodied in another person stands over 
against the self; eacb person, as an independent willing subject, is a Grenze to the other. 
Word in tbe form of person means a personal address which encounters and cballenges 
tbe self from without. Just as freedom is not an attribute of God’s aseity but of God’s 
way of relating to humanity, so transcendence is not an attribute of Cffiisuin-himself 
but a relationship of Christ whose Personstruktur is a pro-me-Sein. He is pro nobis as 
extra nos. The form of transcendence is therefore human sociality: the Word embodied 
in the other person and addressed to me as person is simultaneously extra me and pro 
me.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 215.
66 “Wboever professes to believe in the reality of Jesus Christ, as tbe revelation of God, 
must in the same breath profess his faith in botb their reality of God and the reality of 
tbe world; for in Christ he finds God and the world reconciled . . . .  Belonging wholly to 
Cbrist, be stands at tbe same time wholly in the world.” Dietricb Bonboeffer, Christ, the 
Cburcb, and tbe World, in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed. Ray Anderson, 
Edinhurgh ( T & T  Clark) 1979, 544.
67 “In Christ bumanity really is drawn into community with God, just as in Adam humanity 
fell. And even tbougb in tbe one Adam there are many adams, yet there is only Christ. 
For Adam is ‘representative human heing’, hut Christ is tbe Lord of his new bumanity.” 
Bonboeffer, Snctorum , 146.
68 “In other words, one person cannot know tbe other, hut can only acknowledge and 
‘helieve’ in tbe other.” Ihid., 54. Bonhoeffer’s statement here sbows tbat he is not thinking 
of tbe other in a concept of totalization.
69 “Accordingly, Bonhoeffer understands tbe Word of Christ to he bistorical, in the sense 
that it encounters people, calling for responsihle decision; tbis encounter occurs in human 
social relations, and, since the bistoricity of human Existenz consists of decision in this 
social-etbical encounter witb otbers in community, historicity and sociality are intrinsic 
to each otber.” Green, Bonboeffer, 223.
70 “Tbis ‘existing for others’ which people encounter in Jesus is notbing other tban encounter 
witb authentic transcendence.” Ihid., 273.
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hum anity.71 For Bonhoeffer, loving the other ط  not sim ply loving Christ, 
as if I eould say, “I hate him, but love Jesus in h im ؛” Bonhoeffer states, 
“I do not love C od in the ‘neighbor,’ but I love the eonerete You؛ I love 
the You by plaeing m yself, my entire w ill, in the serviee o f the Y ou.”72 
This possibility o f eom ^ rtm en ta liza tion  (I hate you, but love Jesus 
in y o u ؛) is exaetly w hat Levinas fears in a C hristologieal perspeetive. It 
is only theology, Levinas w ould  assert, that allow s one to malee sueh a 
statem ent. It is theology that gives eategories to humanity, keeping one 
from  the faee o f the other. The transeendent for Bonhoeffer, however, is 
in the historieal. It is this-worldly, not otherworldly. This m eans for Bon- 
hoeffer that loving the other is loving the other. The eall o f Christ is first 
to the w orld , in m eeting the other as, and only as, the other. I partake in 
Christ not as a third party, but as I and other shared relationality, as the 
spirit o f soeiality, as the objeetive spirit.73 It is here in the objeetive spirit 
that Christ is present, not as a possessed entity, but as an infinity. If I 
totalize the other in seeing her, denying her infinity, the soeial or objeetive 
spirit that eonneets us as a soeiologieal reality is degraded and beeom es 
destruetive. The objeetive reality o f our sociality is totalization. I state 
upon seeing her, for exam ple, “T hat’s a w om an thing to do. I k now  h ow  
people like you think. T hat’s a typical M exican  attitude.” In the objec- 
tive spirit o f totalization, Christ cannot be found. From totalization is 
bred hatred, violenee, and dehum anization, all w hich the m inistry o f the 
historical Christ opposes, w h ere  the objective spirit o f our relationality  
is infinite, however, w here I am open to see anew and again this other 
before me and share in her humanity, Christ is present (making theology  
possible). We together share in the ministry o f Christ, w hich is the hu- 
m anization o f humanity, o f com m unity, in the new  hum anity . 7 ه  Therefore
71 Green continues this point of Bonhoeffer’s: “Christ is interpreted as present in human 
form in the matrix of social relationships; his presence is the reality of the universal 
new humanity, in its corporate and individual dimensions, and the Christian community 
is the community of persons where the reality of the new humanity of Christ becomes 
actual in the social world.” Ibid., 183.
72 Bonhoeffer, Snctorum , 16 و .
73 “Objective spirit is thus to be regarded as the connection between historical and communal 
meaning, between the temporal and spatial intentions of a community. Objective spirit 
is will exerting itself effectively on members of the community.” Ibid., 99. Bonhoeffer 
continues: “It leads an individual life ‘beyond’ the individual persons, and yet it is real 
only through them. The more alive the individual persons, the more powerful the objective 
spirit. It interacts reciprocally with each individual and with them all. To withdraw from 
it is to withdraw from the community. It wills historical continuity as well as the social 
realization of its will.” Ibid., 100.
74 For Levinas, it is language that bridges the infinity of the 1 and the other. For Bonhoeffer, 
language is also significant. For both, it is the vehicle to meet the other. Levinas states: “In 
the approach of a face the flesh becomes word, the caress a saying.” Levinas, Otherwise, 
94. For Bonhoeffer, however, it is given a more nuanced theological understanding. 
For there to be true human interaction to the depth of ethical substitution, the Word 
of God must be present in one’s community of shared relationality. This kerygma can 
come in many different forms, but when it comes from the other, it comes as the Word
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for Bonhoeffer, it is Christ that allow s the 1 to see the other, for the 1 to  
recognize the infinity o f the neighbor.75
W orldly transcendence is equally im portant for both Eevinas and 
Bonhoeffer. For both m en, it leads to ethics. If philosophy is totalizing, 
it w ill lead to violence and war. If theology Is otherworldly, it w ill lead to  
com pliance and inaction, easily m olded to the sttucture o f power ideol- 
ogy, and becom e m eaningless. For one to be saved from a philosophy o f  
violence or a theology o f m eaninglessness, one m ust be w illing to enter 
into substitution for the other. One m ust be w illing to stand in for the 
other, acquiring guilt for the other, giving the very food  from his m outh to  
the other. In B onhoeffer’s w ords, one m ust becom e deputy for the other. 
“The father acts for the children, w orking for them , caring for them, 
fighting and suffering for them. Thus in a real sense he is their deputy ... . 
D eputyship ... res^ n sib ility , lies only in the com plete surrender o f on e’s 
ow n life to the other m an . ” 7 ة
To live the Christian life, to partake in theology, to do true philoso- 
phy, to avoid totalization, one m ust delve deep into the life o f the other, 
so deep that one is w illing to suffer for the other and to suffer from the 
other. It is only in this incarnational entering, Fevinas w ould  assert (though  
m eaning it in a non-theological w ay), that ethics and philosophy are pos- 
sible. For Bonhoeffer, it is only in the responsibility o f acquired guilt that 
ethics and theology are possible. W ithout it, philosophy becom es im pos- 
sible because it detaches itself from  the m etaphysical. Christian theology  
becom es im possible becom es it detaches itself from  Jesus Christ. “If any 
m an tries to escape guilt in respom ibility  he detaches h im self from the 
ultim ate reality o f hum an existence, and w hat is m ore he cuts h im self off 
from  the redeem ing mystery o f Christ’s bearing guilt w ithout sin and he 
has no share in the divine justification w hich lies upon this event.”77
of God that places such a demand upon me that 1 cannot 1ههلك  away without being in 
disobedience. Green explains Bonboeffer’s position further: “Christ is present as Word 
in tbe form of living address between persons. ... Christ is person, and he encounters 
us in the word of address from anotber human person, tbat is, in the sermon. Word in 
the form of address requires a hearer and a responsible answer. But this means that the 
Word is an event in community.” Green, Bonboeffer, 213.
73 Green explains Bonboeffer’s perspective furtber: “Transcendence is not Cod’s otherness 
beyond humanity and above the world; the holy, creating, sustaining, and reconciling
love of God which is revealed in Cbrist is God’s lordsbip in the world among buman 
beings . . . .  God is present in the encounter of individuals and their communities as
Kollektivpersonen. The ‘otber,’ as individual person and corporate person, is the ‘form’ 
in wbicb God is really present as the divine O tber’ in the world. Transcendence in 
Bonhoeffer’s tbeology of sociality, tben, is socio-etbical transcendence, ffs form is the 
social form of human personal life, and its content and goal is to create and redeem 
community between human beings and Cbrist and among human beings themselves.” 
Ibid., 64. He adds: “The sociality of the Word in the address-encounters between persons 
in community means that the other person, as an etbical subject in community, is the 
form of both the otherness and the presence of Cbrist.” Ibid., 213.
76 Bonhoeffer, Christ, 54و .
77 Ibid., 561.
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Both Levinas and Bonhoeffer m ust m ove to this extrem e and un- 
eom fortable position. If the transeendent is historieal and found in the 
relational eonneetion o f I and the other, and if philosophy and theology  
are found only here, then one m ust be w illing to give all in relationality  
to the other. To refuse substitution, to refuse to stand in for-the-other and 
give all to the other, is to be a hypoerite.
W hat is substitution, though, and w hat does it m ean to be for-the- 
other? Levinas ean give exam ples o f w hat this kind o f aetion m ay look  
like and w hat it m ight mean. In the end, however, it seems too heavy 
a burden to earry, too  speeulative to direet me truly, too  lonely to be 
possible. It rings as powerfully true but seems too slippery to grasp. A 
substitutionary exam ple w ould  be helpful. Bonhoeffer can give just such 
an exam ple in the person and m inistry o f Jesus Christ.
It is Jesus w ho is the true subsitutionary figure. In follow ing Jesus, 
I find m yself being for-the-other. M ore than just an exam ple, this is a 
call for vicarious action. I act w ith  my w hole self but find the source o f  
my power to act beyond m yself. It remains m yself that I risk -  it is my 
food  I provide, it is my time I give -  but in giving it I not only partake 
unm ediated w ith  m y neighbor, but unm ediated w ith the Spirit o f Christ, 
w ho em powers and accom panies me in this ethical act.78 In the vicarious 
power o f Jesus Christ and his present power, I go to the other, I stand  
com pletely for-the-other . 7 و
A love which left man alone in his guilt would not be love for tbe real man. As 
one wbo acts responsibly in the bistorical existence of men Jesus becomes guilty.
It must be emphasized that it is solely His love which makes him incur guilt . . . .
It is as the one wbo is without sin that Jesus takes upon Himself the guilt of His 
brotbers, and it is under the burden of this guilt that He shows Himself to be 
without sin. In this Jesus Christ, wbo is guilty without sin, lies the origin of every 
action of responsible deputyship.o
An ethic o f s u b s t i tu t io n  to the radical extent that Levinas envisions it 
m ay only be possible from a theological perspective.^!
78 Bonhoeffer further discusses the extent to wbicb one is responsibility must lead, but 
he also shows that the power to do sucb is engendered by the grace of God: “Wben 
a man takes guilt upon bimself in responsibility, and no responsible man can avoid 
this, he imputes this guilt to himself and to no one else; be answers for it; he accepts 
responsibility for it. He does not do this in the insolent presumptuousness of his own 
power, but he does it in the knowledge tbat tbis liberty is forced upon him and that in 
this liberty he is dependent on grace. Before other men the man of free responsibility is 
justified by necessity; before himself he is acquitted by his conscience; but before God 
he hopes only for mercy.” Ibid., 566.
79 “This is why the principle of vicarious representative action can become fundamental 
for the clucl^com m unity of God in and though Christ. Not ‘solidarity,’ which is never 
possible between Christ and human beings, but vicarious representative action is the 
life-principle of the new humanity.” Bonhoeffer, Snctorum , 146-147.
80 Bonhoeffer, Christ, 561.
81 “In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of substitution 
for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution and from the persecuting
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Substitution at this level happens w ithin  a deeper understanding o f  
eom m unity than allow ed for by Levinas. Levinas’s diseussion o f ethies 
remains only interpersonal. H e is skeptieal o f larger soeial units. D oubtful 
that they ean truly aet ethieally, he believes their w ill is too  divided to  
eseape self-interest. Bonhoeffer’s w hole projeet, however, is direeted to the 
com m unity. H e holds that the com m unity can act ethically, both member 
to member and church G em einde  to another G em ein de . Bonhoeffer can 
assert this both because o f his socio log ica l/an th rop ologica l understanding  
of com m unity and because o f his theological com m itm ents. Bonhoeffer as- 
serts that the social com m unal spirit interacts w ith  other com m unities just 
as the individual spirit interacts w ith  other individuals.82 “Every concept 
of com m unity is essentially related to a concept o f person. It is im pos- 
sible to say w hat constitutes com m unity w ithout asking w hat constitutes 
a p e r s o n . H e r e ,  too , the com m unity m ust be a distinct enjoying (wor- 
shipping) com m unity, unique from  all others in its rituals. These rituals 
of w orship m ust be arcane, as Bonhoeffer w ould  assert, not dividing us 
from  other com m unities but preparing us for action on their behalf. The 
com m unity, just like the individual, m ust be open and closed to all others, 
distinct from the w orld  but com pletely open to it. Eor Bonhoeffer, this is 
possible theologically because Jesus Christ n ow  exists as Kollectivperson.  
H e exists in the m idst o f our individual and com m unal relations both in 
the com m unity and in the w orld. If the com m unity is “in Christ,” if it 
is experiencing life in the Kollectivperson  o f Jesus, it m ust continue to  
crucify its ow n self-interest, binding closer together in one w ill, risking 
its very existence in reaching out ethically to the w orld.
Substitionary ethics done as Kollectivperson  seems m uch m ore plausible 
in practical life.84 W hen I am personally confronted for help by m y drug-
itself in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears 
even responsibility for tbe persecuting by the persecutor.” Levinas, Otberwise, 73. Tbis 
quote of Levinas begs for a Christological reading, and peering at it through Bonhoeffer, 
we can see its possibilities.
82 Green deepens my point: “Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of person, it is imperative to 
understand, is a concept which is corporate as well as individual. This clearly distinguisbes 
his position from philosophers and theologians such as Martin Buber, Eberhard Grisebach, 
Eriedrich Gogarten, and Emil Brunner. These thinkers made much of the concept ofperson, 
and of the I-You relation -  wbicb Bonboeffer also uses. But the concept of the person 
in tbeir work remains an individual concept, since its locus is in the relation between 
individuals as 1 and You; tberefore their positions could be described as inter-personal 
personalism. Bonhoeffer goes beyond this usage in a quite original way to sbow tbat 
the concept of the person is fruitful for understanding corporate buman communities, 
and the relation of individuals to tbem.” Green, Bonboeffer, 30.
83 Bonboeffer, Sanctorum, 34.
84 “ [RJeciprocity between individual and corporate life wbicb is essential in Bonboeffer’s 
understanding of sociality; it forgets that the ethical is intrinsic to the definition of ‘person.’ 
The very reason be applies to communities his own model of the buman person is to 
guarantee that tbey are understood to bave the same etbical-bistorical cbaracter as the 
individual person . . . .  Corporate communities as sucb, pace still prevalent ideologies.
Andrew ffoot74
addicted relative w ho needs a ^lace to stay after being evicted from  his 
a^ rtm e n t, 1 m ust not turn from his need. A lthough it is inconvenient and 
potentially dangerous, I m ust give all to the other. Another also confronts 
m e, however: m y ow n small child, w ho dem ands a safe and calm  environ- 
m ent in w hich to grow. I am stuck between the dem and of tw o opposed  
others. It is in this bind that I need the com m unity, for w e together are 
called to substitution. We as Kollectivpersonen  can act w ithout hesita- 
tion. I w ill find a bed for him  in the hom e o f one in the com m unity, not 
m aking him  their problem , but together (as a com m unity) sharing in his 
need, acting for him ethically. It is then in this ethical act, as com m unity, 
for the other, that w e together enter into ministry and do theology.
Conclusion: Levinas, ?ractical Theology, 
and Social Ethical ^ sp o m ib il i ty
Through this study, w e have seen that an understanding o f Christian the- 
ology as practical theology, as a discipline engendered from  the practice 
of m inistry in the presence o f the historically transcendent C od and the 
infinite neighbor, has the possibility o f avoiding the critical dangers that 
Levinas perceives w ith  theology. This opens to those in the field o f practi- 
cal theology the depth o f Levinas’s thought as a resource and direction  
in constructing praxis-oriented theologies. M ore importantly, it show s 
the philosophical necessity o f practice leading to theory, o f philosophy as 
ethical action, “^ e-o n e -fo r -th e -o th er  is the foundation o f theory, for it 
m akes possible relationship ... . ”85 Levinas has show n us that this relation- 
ship is w ith  the m etaphysical. To do philosophy, one m ust embrace the 
m etaphysical, and the m etaphysical can only be found in the historical 
existence o f the hum an other. This clears the ground, show ing that the 
place o f theoretical construction can only be alongside the neighbor.
By reading Levinas alongside Bonhoeffer, w e can see h ow  social ethical 
res^ n s ib ility  is theologically justified and, at points, m ade m ore accessible. 
Eor both Levinas and Bonhoeffer, w e only experience the transcendent 
w hen w e step out and give ourselves totally to our neighbor, to the other. 
In doing so, the divine and the hum an are so fused that to deal w ith  the 
one is to deal with the other. Bonhoeffer has m ade this even m ore concrete
are not ethically neutral; they are ethical ‘bodies’ as mucb as tbe individual person. 
Accordingly, this corporate use of the concept of person insists tbat individuals are not 
private persons but people wbo bave responsibility for the socio-ethical life of their 
communities; to use ‘person’ also as a corporate concept is to remind individuals that tbeir 
personal life essentially includes a corporate dimension . . . .  Indeed, since tbere can be no 
Kollektivperson apart from a community of individual persons, it is in individual persons 
that the call to corporate, etbical responsibility is heard.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 42.
85 Levinas, Otberwise, 136.
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by show ing h ow  Jesus Christ is the transeendent other that m eets us in 
the historieal ethieal aetion o f I and other. In this ethieal aet, philosophy  
and theology beeom e possible, for they avoid being only pedantie (and 
at w orst, destruetive) exereises, im portant to only a few  tueked away  
in the damp eorners o f libraries. Rather, if w e are w illing to see soeial 
ethical action as a paradigm  for practical theology, w e w ill be thrust out 
into the bright light o f the lived w orld , to construct theology together in 
our ministry, as a collective com m unity, alongside the other w ho calls, 
together serving and suffering for the w orld.
Z sa m m en fa ssu n g
In ihrer Bezugnahme auf konkrete Menschen und die jeweiligen Kontexte, in denen 
sie leben, vollziebt sieb Theologie in einem kontinuierlicben Prozess der Anpassung 
und des Übergangs. Nach Ansicht des Verfassers ist darum auch die theologische Re- 
flexion ^arram tlicher Praxis stets in einem engen Z sam m enhang  mit den ethischen 
Handlungsvollzügen zu seben, die den Anderen als den nahen oder fernen Näcbsten 
in den Blick nehmen. Diese Tbese wird im Rabmen einer Analyse der Pbilosopbie von 
Emmanuel Levinas entwickelt. Dabei werden zunächst die Grundzüge seines Denkens 
dargestelh und gerade auch die Vorbebahe Levinas’ gegenüber der Theologie namhaft 
gemacht. Sodann sucht der Verfasser zu zeigen, dass und wie eine Theologie, die sieb 
prinzipiell als Praktische Theologie im Sinne einer Tbeologie mit und für den Anderen 
begreife, viele Befürchtungen von Levinas hinsichtlich der Tbeologie relativieren könne, 
und dass sein Denken für Praktische Tbeologen überaus anregend sei. tim  diese Thesen 
zu untermauern, bringt der Verfasser Levinas’ Philosophie und Dietricb Bonboeffers 
Theologie miteinander ins Gespräch, wobei sich viele Abnhcbkeüen zeigen und zugleich 
deutheb wird, wie sieb Levinas’ Einwände gegenüber der Theologie mit Hilfe von 
Bonhoeffers theologischen Einsichten entkräften lassen. Der Aufsatz sebheßt mit der 
Eorderung, den Aspekt der sozialetbiscben Verantwortung, deren prinzipielle Bedeutung 
von Levinas und Bonboeffer gleichermaßen hervorgehohen worden sei, als ein zentral 
wichtiges Paradigma praktiscb-tbeologiscber Arheit zu hegreifen.
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